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workplaces, the DOL’s enforcement efforts are often thwarted.
To address this thorny problem, Professor Lee develops a novel approach. Similar to other scholars, he
advocates better coordination between ICE and the DOL so that workplace-immigration enforcement does
not deteriorate employees’ rights. Importantly, however, Professor Lee diverges from prior accounts by
focusing on the potential of interagency coordination between these two agencies at the “ex ante stage.”
Specifically, Professor Lee contends that, along with ex post visa solutions, the DOL should monitor ICE’s
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ICE WAS NOT MEANT TO BE COLD: 
THE CASE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS MONITORING 
OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT  
AT THE WORKPLACE 
Kati L. Griffith* 
INTRODUCTION 
In his article, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, Professor Stephen 
Lee offers an innovative solution to a thorny problem.1 The roots of the problem 
are embedded in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”).2 
With IRCA, the U.S. Congress experimented with a new way to regulate 
immigration. Rather than focusing primarily on the U.S.–Mexico border as a 
strategy to reduce illegal immigration, Congress tried to weaken what it viewed as 
the leading cause of illegal immigration—job opportunities for unauthorized 
immigrants. To achieve this goal, Congress required employers to verify the 
immigration status of their prospective employees and fashioned sanctions for 
employers who knowingly employ unauthorized employees.3 Through a later 
amendment to IRCA, Congress also created sanctions for employees who 
knowingly use fraudulent documents to gain employment.4 
Professor Lee and others have convincingly argued that IRCA’s 
workplace-based immigration enforcement scheme poses a series of formidable 
obstacles to the workplace-based protections that are afforded to authorized and 
                                                                                                            
   	  ∗ Proskauer Assistant Professor of Employment and Labor Law, Industrial and 
Labor Relations School, Cornell University. I would like to extend a special thank you to 
Mark Gough and Andrea Milano for their thorough research assistance related to IRCA’s 
legislative history. I appreciate Leslie Gates, Margaret Hu, Leticia Saucedo, Juliet Stumpf, 
and the editors of the Arizona Law Review for their helpful reviews of prior drafts. I would 
also like to thank Vanessa Clarke and Tamara Lee for their research and editorial efforts on 
various aspects of this Response Essay. I take sole responsibility for all errors or omissions. 
    1. Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089 
(2011). 
    2. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 
3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
    3. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)–(b), (f) (2006). 
    4. Id. § 1324c(a), (d). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1967633
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unauthorized employees.5 Professor Lee’s article highlights the problematic role of 
the agency in charge of IRCA enforcement, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”).6 ICE’s IRCA enforcement consists mainly of workplace 
investigations, employer audits, and worksite raids. Professor Lee and others have 
observed that ICE’s enforcement activities too often send the message to 
immigrant employees that immigration law consequences will result if employees 
dare to complain about health and safety risks, employment discrimination, wage 
abuses, or employer interference with employees’ collective activity for their 
mutual aid or protection in the workplace.7 
As Professor Lee discusses, the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”), the 
main agency in charge of health, safety, and wage and hour protections for 
employees, has failed to ward off the negative effects of IRCA’s workplace-based 
immigration enforcement scheme.8 Part of the reason for this failure, as Professor 
Lee convincingly contends, is that ICE has the power to make enforcement 
decisions that affect the workplace rights of employees without consulting the 
DOL.9 For Professor Lee, the DOL’s relative impotence, coupled with ICE’s lack 
of regard for employees’ workplace rights in its immigration enforcement 
measures, allows “bad-actor” employers to trample upon employees’ rights and 
“chills the reporting of labor violations by unauthorized workers.”10 Without 
complaints from employees that identify abusive and non-compliant workplaces, 
the DOL’s enforcement efforts are often thwarted. 
To address this thorny problem, Professor Lee develops a novel approach. 
Similar to other scholars, he advocates better coordination between ICE and the 
DOL so that workplace-immigration enforcement does not deteriorate employees’ 
                                                                                                            
    5. See, e.g., Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: 
Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 737, 746–52 (2003); Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The 
Constitutionality of Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
389, 436–41 (2011); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1105–10 (2009); Gerald L. Neuman, Forward: Dangerous 
Intersection, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 241, 243 (2009); Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers’ 
Rights in a Post-Hoffman World—Organizing Around the Thirteenth Amendment, 18 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 651, 652–58 (2004); Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus 
Employment Law Enforcement: The Case for Integrated Protections in the Immigrant 
Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303, 306–11 (2010); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the 
Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
193, 213. 
    6. See Lee, supra note 1, at 1092–93, 1095, 1104–05. 
    7. See, e.g., id. at 1100–04; Saucedo, supra note 5, at 308 (“[W]hile 
immigration enforcement goals force the round-up and removal of thousands of workers, 
enforcement of employment and labor laws becomes increasingly difficult in the immigrant 
workplace. Employees are afraid to advocate for themselves because they risk removal. The 
fear is real and the stakes continue to escalate.”). See generally Barbara L. Jones, Lawyers 
Find More Immigrant Clients Fear Civil Justice System, THE LEGAL LEDGER (St. Paul), 
June 21, 2007, at 3, 11. 
    8. Lee, supra note 1, at 1098–1105. 
    9. Id. at 1093, 1121, 1127. 
  10. Id. at 1095. 
2011] CIVIL RIGHTS MONITORING 1139 
rights.11 Importantly, however, Professor Lee diverges from prior accounts by 
focusing on the potential of interagency coordination between these two agencies 
at the “ex ante stage.”12 Specifically, Professor Lee contends that, along with ex 
post visa solutions,13 the DOL should monitor ICE’s workplace-based immigration 
enforcement decisions before ICE investigates a workplace.14 For instance, 
Professor Lee proposes that the DOL monitor whether there is an ongoing labor 
dispute at the workplace before ICE takes any enforcement action.15 Thus, the 
DOL’s new monitoring role would be to reduce the negative effects of 
immigration enforcement in the workplace and to strengthen the rights that 
individuals possess as employees.16   
Professor Lee’s proposal addresses ICE’s all-too-often myopic focus on 
aggressive workplace-based immigration enforcement at the expense of its 
“secondary” consideration for employees’ workplace protections.17 In this 
Response Essay, I illuminate that Congress intended worker rights considerations 
to be central to the federal government’s workplace-based immigration 
enforcement scheme, despite ICE’s actions to the contrary.18 In other words, ICE 
was not meant to be “cold” with respect to employees’ workplace protections. In 
particular, I expose Congress’s view that employee civil rights are a fundamental 
aspect of IRCA’s scheme.19 
While Professor Lee’s extensive focus on the DOL is certainly justified, 
my focus on workplace protections that are not within the DOL’s purview brings 
an additional labor agency into the forefront of the immigration monitoring mix. 
Indeed, exposing Congress’s overlooked civil rights considerations illustrates that 
the main federal agency in charge of civil rights in the workplace, the Equal 
                                                                                                            
  11. Id. at 1094, 1123–27. 
  12. Id. at 1094, 1121–28. 
  13. See, e.g., Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”: Organizing Victims and 
Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 944–45 (2008) (contending that 
U visas should be provided to victims of workplace law abuses more frequently to offset the 
negative employment law consequences of restrictive immigration enforcement).  
  14. Lee, supra note 1, at 1123–27. 
  15. Id. at 1125. 
  16. Id. at 1123–27. 
  17. Id. at 1125. ICE does, however, sometimes engage in efforts to protect 
workers. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 5, at 445–49 (describing efforts to reduce ICE’s 
impact on workers’ rights); Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf (recommending prosecutorial discretion for 
unauthorized “plaintiffs in non-frivolous lawsuits regarding civil rights” and stating that it is 
“against ICE policy to remove individuals in the midst of a legitimate effort to protect their 
civil rights”).  
  18. See Saucedo, supra note 5, at 305 (calling for a “more nuanced reading of” 
immigration law and stating that the “enforcement principles of immigration law . . . are 
overemphasized”). 
  19. See Juliet Stumpf & Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through 
Immigration Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
131, 136–37 (2002) (describing IRCA’s civil rights protections as one of “three basic 
components” of the statute). 
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Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), should play a key role in 
monitoring ICE’s workplace-based enforcement actions. Moreover, an intensive 
focus on Congress’s intent with respect to employee civil rights also reveals that 
the EEOC should play a complementary role in educating the public about 
employee civil rights in the immigration enforcement context.   
The civil rights issues that arise in the midst of IRCA’s workplace-based 
enforcement scheme merit special consideration.20 Along with the wage and hour 
and health and safety concerns that Professor Lee portrays,21 too many immigrant 
laborers suffer illegal employment discrimination.22 The EEOC, for instance, 
settled a case that involved unauthorized women who had suffered under “a 
sexually hostile work environment,” which included “sexual assault and rape by 
supervisors.”23 In another case, 15 warehouse employees alleged that they were 
subjected to “daily slurs” against Mexicans, such as “wetback” and “mojado.”24 
Heightened civil rights monitoring of ICE is needed because the interplay 
between workplace-based immigration enforcement and the enforcement of 
employees’ civil rights is often troubling in ways that are similar to what Professor 
Lee describes in the DOL context.25 As civil rights scholar and advocate William 
Tamayo has stated, due to the “vulnerability” of unauthorized workers, “there is 
always a strong temptation for employers to use and abuse them, and to retaliate 
                                                                                                            
  20. See id. at 142 (“With higher levels of immigration enforcement, the State’s 
response to heightened levels of discrimination must keep pace.”); see also id. (stating that 
when “immigration controls tighten,” as they are now, “the potential for resulting 
discrimination intensifies”). 
  21. Lee, supra note 1, at 1092, 1100, 1128; see also Jayesh M. Rathod, 
Immigrant Labor and the Occupational Safety and Health Regime, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 479, 484–501 (2009) (describing health and safety abuses against foreign-born 
workers). 
  22. See, e.g., Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of 
Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker Claims Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 
562 (2010) (citing research on the “particular vulnerability of immigrant workers . . . for 
sexual harassment”); William R. Tamayo, The EEOC and Immigrant Workers, 44 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 253, 261–64 (2009) (discussing numerous EEOC employment discrimination cases 
involving low-wage immigrants). See generally Leticia M. Saucedo, Three Theories of 
Discrimination in the Brown Collar Workplace, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 345 (describing 
various types of discrimination against low-wage and unauthorized immigrants). 
  23. Alec MacGillis, Egg Firm Has Long Record of Violations, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 22, 2010, at A1; see also Julia Preston, After Iowa Raid, Immigrants Fuel Labor 
Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, at A1 (reporting that “[t]he Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission [was] examining accusations of sexual harassment of women at 
the plant” in the wake of a large-scale workplace raid). 
  24. James Pinkerton & Susan Carroll, Raid on Shipley Headquarters, HOUS. 
CHRON., Apr. 17, 2008, at A1. 
  25. Lee, supra note 1, at 1092, 1099–1102, 1123–28; see also Saucedo, supra 
note 5, at 305 (“The enforcement goals of immigration law tend to compete with 
enforcement goals in other areas of law, such as employment law, producing mixed 
results.”). 
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and intimidate them when they assert their rights under law.”26 In the warehouse 
employees’ case described above, for instance, one of the employee–plaintiffs 
testified that the plant manager had “threatened him with deportation if he 
complained” about the discrimination against him as a Mexican.27 ICE raided this 
workplace one month after the civil rights case settled, allegedly based on “a tip 
from disgruntled workers also involved in the discrimination case.”28 Even though 
the EEOC’s consistent stance is that immigration status is not relevant in civil 
rights cases, it recognizes “that it is very difficult for immigrants to access the civil 
legal system.”29 This is the case, at least in part, because of “an ever-present 
implicit fear of deportation.”30 
 Workplace-based immigration enforcement not only affects civil rights 
enforcement on behalf of unauthorized immigrants. It impacts the civil rights of 
authorized employees as well. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
acknowledged, even authorized immigrants “may fear that their immigration status 
would be changed” or that they may bring “immigration problems” to those around 
them if they come forward with employment discrimination complaints.31 
                                                                                                            
  26.  Tamayo, supra note 22, at 271; see also id. at 268 (referring to an EEOC 
case finding that an employer retaliated against an immigrant worker “after he complained 
about national origin discrimination”). 
  27. Pinkerton & Carroll, supra note 24; see also id. (reporting on plaintiff–
employee’s statement that the plant manager had told him that “he had some police friends 
and that he could tell them to arrest me and deport me”). In another case, the plaintiff–
employee did not complain earlier about sexual harassment because “she was worried about 
being deported.” Jones, supra note 7, at 3; see also Gleeson, supra note 22, at 563 
(“[A]dvocates continue to uncover egregious instances of employer intimidation in which 
the immigration status of a worker is often wielded as an overt threat against would-be 
claimants.” (citation omitted)). 
  28. Mary Flood, Shipley Forks Over Hefty Fine After Raid, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 
8, 2009, at B1; see also REBECCA SMITH ET AL., ICED OUT: HOW IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT HAS INTERFERED WITH WORKERS’ RIGHTS 27 (2009), available at 
http://nelp.3cdn.net/75a43e6ae48f67216a_w2m6bp1ak.pdf (“According to news reports, 
ICE initiated a criminal investigation of Shipley in January 2008, after learning of the 
federal employment discrimination lawsuit . . . . A worksite raid followed in April 2008, 
during which 20 workers were arrested.”); Jones, supra note 7, at 11 (describing a 
discrimination case involving an immigrant woman who won her civil rights case but “was 
deported within a week”). 
  29. Jones, supra note 7, at 3, 11. 
  30. Gleeson, supra note 22, at 580 (finding, based on 41 interviews, that both 
employer intimidation and fear of deportation “inhibit claims making”).  
  31. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004); see also id. 
(“[N]ew legal residents or citizens may feel intimidated by the prospect of having their 
immigration history examined in a public proceeding. Any of these individuals, failing to 
understand the relationship between their litigation and immigration status, might choose to 
forego civil rights litigation.”); Leticia M. Saucedo, The Browning of the American 
Workplace: Protecting Workers in Increasingly Latino-ized Occupations, 80 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 303, 315 (2004) (“[B]rown collar workers may fear immigration consequences if 
they come forward with complaints. This holds true whether a brown collar worker is 
documented or undocumented. The current immigration law framework engenders fear in a 
population that does not understand immigration law and its evolving standards. The fear is 
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Moreover, the seemingly close relationship between immigration and workplace 
enforcement can intimidate authorized immigrant employees who are in the United 
States on employment visas. In a recent employment discrimination case, for 
instance, plaintiff employees claimed that “rather than protecting the Indian [guest] 
workers, immigration officials coached the company on how to silence and deport 
them.”32   
To show that employee civil rights should be viewed as a central 
component of the federal government’s workplace-based immigration enforcement 
scheme, Parts I and II draw from IRCA’s text and its 15-year-long legislative 
history. As this analysis illuminates, while Congress did intend to bring restrictive 
immigration enforcement into the workplace, it did not intend to do so in a way 
that weakens the existing civil rights that individuals possess as employees. 
Furthermore, these Parts reveal that Congress viewed interagency coordination and 
public education involving the EEOC as critical to achieving IRCA’s civil rights 
goals. Given this view and the paramount civil rights considerations embedded in 
IRCA, Part III expands upon Professor Lee’s proposal to make the case that the 
EEOC should become a civil rights monitor and educator in the workplace-based 
immigration enforcement context.33 
I. CIVIL RIGHTS AND IRCA 
One does not need to look far to see that the preservation of workers’ 
rights in general, and civil rights in particular, are an essential ingredient of 
Congress’s workplace-based immigration enforcement scheme under IRCA. 
Congress included, for example, an appropriation of funding to the DOL to 
increase enforcement of federal wage and hour law on behalf of unauthorized 
employees.34 Moreover, Congress embedded significant civil rights protections for 
employees and potential employees directly in the structure of IRCA.35 
With IRCA, Congress provided new employment discrimination 
protections to supplement Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”). Title VII, 
which is enforced by the EEOC, protects employees from discrimination based on 
                                                                                                            
not without some reason, as immigration authorities have targeted brown collar industries 
like meatpacking for enforcement of immigration laws.”). 
  32. Editorial, Standing Up for Guest Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2011, at A26. 
  33. While it is not the focus here, other labor agencies are coordinating efforts 
with immigration authorities to some extent. See, e.g., Revised Memorandum of 
Understanding Between U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. and U.S. Dep’t of Labor 1 (Mar. 31, 
2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/HispanicLaborForce/dhs-dol-
mou.pdf; Memorandum from Richard A. Siegel, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd. (June 7, 2011), available at http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/
2011,0609-nlrb.pdf. 
  34. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 111(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 
(2006). 
  35. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975, 1984 
(2011) (describing IRCA’s antidiscrimination protections and suggesting that 
antidiscrimination protections were part of Congress’s intent to balance “a variety of 
interests”). 
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race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.36 IRCA’s new employment 
discrimination protections prohibit employers from discriminating based on an 
authorized employee’s national origin or citizenship status.37 IRCA also prohibits 
individuals from retaliating against authorized employees who complain, or who 
intend to complain, about employment discrimination based on national origin or 
citizenship status.38 Moreover, according to IRCA, employers cannot implement 
their verification procedures for ensuring that their employees are work authorized 
in ways that discriminate based on national origin or citizenship status.39 Through 
a 1990 amendment, Congress increased monetary penalties for violations of 
IRCA’s antidiscrimination protections so that they match monetary sanctions on 
employers for violations of other aspects of IRCA.40 
Congress created a new federal agency to enforce IRCA’s employment 
discrimination protections. This new agency, the Office of Special Counsel for 
Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices (“Special Counsel”), is housed 
in the U.S. Department of Justice.41 Unlike typical immigration enforcement 
agencies—which do not involve the participation of private individuals—the 
Special Counsel includes private and public enforcement measures.42 It mainly 
enforces its civil rights protections through the receipt and investigation of 
employee-initiated complaints about discrimination or retaliation. If employees are 
successful in their suits, they can receive injunctive relief, civil penalties, 
reinstatement, and back pay for the time they missed work due to their employers’ 
discriminatory acts.43 The Special Counsel can also take affirmative enforcement 
actions in the absence of a private complaint from an employee to address larger 
pattern or practice violations.44  
While IRCA contained its own protections against discrimination and its 
own agency to enforce those protections, Congress also viewed interagency 
coordination with the EEOC as crucial to protect against any discrimination that 
would ensue as a result of workplace-based immigration enforcement. For 
instance, Congress created a “joint taskforce,” which included the EEOC and the 
Attorney General.45 The taskforce was charged with working together to evaluate, 
over a three-year period, whether IRCA resulted in employment discrimination 
based on citizenship status or national origin.46 Moreover, Congress intended the 
Special Counsel to work in coordination with the EEOC to remedy employment 
                                                                                                            
  36. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
  37. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (2006). 
  38. See id. § 1324b(a)(5). 
  39. See id. § 1324b(a)(6). 
  40. See id. § 1324b(g)(2)(B). 
  41. See id. § 1324b(c). 
  42. See Stumpf & Friedman, supra note 19, at 136 (“IRCA combines the private 
enforcement characteristic of civil rights laws with the federalized public enforcement of 
the immigration laws.”).  
  43. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
  44. See id. § 1324b(c)(2). 
  45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(j)(1), (k)(1) (1994) (repealed 1996). 
  46. See id. 
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discrimination.47 For cases involving national origin discrimination, for example, 
the Special Counsel takes cases that involve workplaces with between 4 and 14 
employees.48 If an employer has 15 or more employees, the Special Counsel refers 
the case to the EEOC.49 Similarly, if the EEOC receives a case that it does not 
have jurisdiction over, it will refer the case to the Special Counsel.50 
To support these civil rights measures, Congress fostered an educational 
campaign along with the interagency coordination described above. Specifically, 
through a 1990 amendment, Congress required a number of agencies to 
disseminate information in order to “increas[e] the knowledge of employers, 
employees, and the general public concerning employer and employee rights, 
responsibilities, and remedies” related to these civil rights protections.51 To “carry 
out the campaign” the Special Counsel was required to “consult with” the EEOC, 
the DOL, and the Administrator of the Small Business Administration “as may be 
appropriate.”52 
Congress saw IRCA and Title VII as working together to protect against 
civil rights infringements that may result from workplace-based immigration 
enforcement. Notably, IRCA’s educational campaign related not only to IRCA’s 
antidiscrimination protections, but also to Title VII’s protections. IRCA requires 
agencies to disseminate information about IRCA and Title VII’s protections 
against “unfair immigration-related employment practices.”53   
As this Part demonstrated, civil rights were a basic tenet of the 
workplace-based immigration enforcement scheme that Congress created with 
IRCA. Moreover, Congress undoubtedly intended interagency coordination and 
public education to facilitate IRCA and Title VII’s antidiscrimination goals. Thus, 
ICE’s workplace-based immigration enforcement actions should consistently be 
informed by civil rights considerations. The EEOC should help ensure that ICE 
fulfills this central mission of IRCA through an ex ante monitoring and educational 
role. As Part II will explore, IRCA’s legislative history supports this view.  
II. CIVIL RIGHTS AND IRCA’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
IRCA’s 15-year legislative history illustrates Congress’s concern about 
employees’ workplace rights and the employment discrimination that could result 
                                                                                                            
  47. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(b)(2) (2006) (stating that an employee cannot file a 
complaint under IRCA’s discrimination protections “if a charge with respect to that practice 
based on the same set of facts has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission under [T]itle VII . . . , unless the charge is dismissed as being outside the scope 
of such title”). 
  48. See id. 
  49. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006). 
  50. A memorandum of understanding between the EEOC and the Special 
Counsel details the ongoing interagency coordination. See Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n and the Office of Special Counsel for 
Immigration Related Unfair Emp’t Practices (Dec. 18, 1997), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/oscmou.html. 
  51. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(l)(1) (2006). 
  52. Id. § 1324b(l)(1)(2). 
  53. Id. § 1324b(l).  
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from the imposition of workplace-based immigration enforcement. It also shows 
Congress’s intent to involve the EEOC in interagency coordination and education 
to protect against employment discrimination.   
Throughout legislative consideration of what eventually became IRCA, 
lawmakers often couched the need for workplace-based immigration reform within 
a broader concern about the workplace experiences of authorized and unauthorized 
workers.54 With respect to authorized workers, a good deal of the unease focused 
on what many viewed as unfair job competition between authorized and 
unauthorized workers.55 For instance, in 1975, Representative Joshua Eilberg 
stated that the proposed legislation “deal[s] with the real culprit, the employer who 
repeatedly and with impunity hires illegal aliens rather than giving the jobs to 
citizens and legal residents who could demand a living wage and decent working 
conditions.”56 
With respect to unauthorized workers, many members communicated that 
workplace-based immigration reform was necessary to offset ongoing employer 
abuses against these workers. One lawmaker, for example, referred to workplace 
conditions for unauthorized workers as “tragic.”57 Another described “vile forms 
of exploitation and extortion,” including unauthorized workers who worked long 
hours without any pay at all.58 Indeed, as noted in Part I, the enacted legislation 
included increased wage and hour enforcement on behalf of unauthorized 
                                                                                                            
  54. See Wishnie, supra note 5, at 203–05 (citing legislative history showing 
Congress’s concerns about workers). 
  55. See, e.g., Illegal Aliens: Hearings on H.R. 982 and Related Bills Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
94th Cong. 112–14, 139, 240, 325 (1975) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 982] (describing 
unfair competition between authorized and unauthorized workers as motivation for new 
legislation); SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT 
COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 506–16 (1981) [hereinafter SCIRP 
SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL REPORT] (describing negative labor market effects as the “major 
consequence” of the presence of unauthorized workers); 128 CONG. REC. 20,829 (1982) 
(statement of Sen. Simpson) (referring to a goal “to eliminate the illegal subclass of 
persons” whose “illegal status and their resulting weak bargaining position cause these 
people to depress U.S. wages and working conditions . . . [and] may have the effect of 
hindering the participation even of legal immigrants from the same country of origin, as 
they become people who are afraid to . . . go to their employer”); 119 CONG. REC. 14,186 
(1973) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (describing the legislation as an effort “to [e]nsure that 
such [job] opportunities are made available for U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents 
who have been severely disadvantaged by the presence of large numbers of illegal aliens in 
this country”). 
  56. Hearings on H.R. 982, supra note 55, at 1 (statement of Rep. Eilberg, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and Int’l Law). 
  57. Id.; see also id. (stating that unauthorized workers “are forced to live under 
the worst conditions and as a result of their precarious status they must accept any form of 
abuse and mistreatment their employers choose to hand out”). 
  58. Id. at 135 (statement of Rep. Biaggi); see also id. (referring to “tales of 
horror regarding [unauthorized workers’] working conditions”); SCIRP SUPPLEMENT TO THE 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 516 (describing unauthorized workers as “vulnerable” to 
employer abuse). 
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employees in order to address some of these injustices and to “reduce the incentive 
for employers to hire undocumented” workers.59 
While many lawmakers viewed workplace-based immigration 
enforcement as something that could eventually offset ongoing workplace abuses 
against employees, many also saw that it could foster a new kind of abuse of 
employee rights—employment discrimination against authorized workers based on 
their perceived national origin or citizenship status. Representative Edward Roybal 
summed up this sentiment well: “In our zeal to eradicate the evils of labor 
exploitation and unemployment, we must be careful not to create legislation that 
would inadvertently perpetuate discrimination and lack of equal opportunity in 
employment.”60 Indeed, fear about the negative civil rights consequences of a new 
workplace-immigration enforcement scheme was ever-present from the early 
1970s when Congress started to consider legislative action61 until 1986, when 
Congress finally passed IRCA.62 
                                                                                                            
  59. S. REP. NO. 97-485, at 120 (1982); id. (“Part of the incentive to hire 
undocumented aliens is their willingness to accept substandard wages and working 
conditions. We must therefore intensify the enforcement of existing laws, including the 
minimum wage . . . .”); 129 CONG. REC. 12,816 (1983) (statement of Sen. Cranston) (“A 
less expensive and more effective alternative to the employer sanctions law would be to 
enforce labor laws already on the books. There would be little profitability in exploiting 
undocumented workers—and little incentive to hire them—if minimum wage, OSHA and 
fair labor standards laws were strictly enforced.”); see also S. REP. NO. 99-132, at 29 (1985) 
(proposing to authorize an increase in appropriations for wage and hour enforcement); U.S. 
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: THE FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 70 
(1981) (same). 
  60. Illegal Aliens: Hearings Before the Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 83 (1973) [hereinafter Hearings Before the Subcomm. No. 1]. 
  61. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 30,182–83 (1972) (statement of Rep. Badillo) 
(noting concern about employment discrimination); id. at 30,167 (statement of Rep. Kazen) 
(same); see also, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 982, supra note 55, at 168 (statement of Rep. 
White) (noting “the obvious discrimination that will result against any prospective 
employee who might be suspected to be an alien because of appearance or spoken accent”); 
id. at 51–52 (statement of Rep. Holtzman, Member, Comm. on the Judiciary and the 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and Int’l Law) (“I am terribly concerned that these 
people, some of whom are naturalized U.S. citizens and some of whom are lawful residents, 
would be put to an intolerable burden under this legislation.”); 119 CONG. REC. 14,195 
(1973) (statement of Rep. Kazen) (stating “that this bill will encourage discrimination”); id. 
at 14,192 (statement of Rep. Clausen) (stating the bill “would set a dangerous precedent”). 
  62. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 97-485, at 119 (1982) (noting that during SCIRP’s 
“work, as well as during the extensive hearings of the Subcommittee on Immigration and 
Refugee Policy” one of the “central objections” that was “raised again and again” was “that 
the proposed employer sanctions might result in discrimination”); SCIRP SUPPLEMENT TO 
THE FINAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 566–76 (describing fear of employment discrimination 
and referring to it as one of the “major criticisms” launched against earlier proposals); see 
also Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982: Joint Hearings on H.R. 5872 and 
S. 2222 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 101 (1982) [hereinafter Joint Hearings on H.R. 5872 and S. 2222] 
(statement of Sen. Kennedy, Member, Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting concern about 
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Lawmakers directed their civil rights concerns at both explicit and more 
subtle forms of employment discrimination that could result if Congress passed the 
proposed legislation. As Representative Augustus Hawkins stated in 1984, 
“employers who are inclined to discriminate [will have] a convenient pretext for 
their action.”63 He went on to note that other employers, out of fear of liability, 
will discriminate as they “make a good faith effort to comply with the [new] 
law.”64 According to Representative Hawkins, this would be the case because the 
legislation “will necessarily create a suspect class of persons who, on the basis of 
physical appearance, language or other factors, appear foreign to employers.”65 
Representative Hawkins’s latter statement represented many other lawmakers’ 
worries that too many employers, out of fear of potential sanctions for hiring an 
unauthorized employee, would exclude most or all applicants from particular 
national origins in order to “play it safe.”66 
IRCA’s legislative history demonstrates that lawmakers were particularly 
worried about the legislation’s impact on the civil rights of Latino67 and Asian68 
                                                                                                            
employment discrimination); Immigration Reform, Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Immigration, Refugees, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 
1031 (1981) (statement of Rep. Roybal) (same); 132 CONG. REC. 31,632 (1986) (statement 
of Rep. Rodino) (same); 130 CONG. REC. 16,230 (1984) (statement of Rep. Hawkins) 
(same); id. at 16,222 (statement of Rep. Edwards) (same); id. at 15,882 (statement of Rep. 
Richardson) (same); 129 CONG. REC. 12,867 (1983) (statement of Sen. Wilson) (same); 128 
CONG. REC. 20,850 (1982) (statement of Sen. Hart) (same). 
  63. 130 CONG. REC. 15,740 (1984) (statement of Rep. Hawkins); see also id. at 
15,910 (same) (“[D]espite the laudable purpose behind this bill, there are those in this 
Nation who would use this measure as a pretext to deny employment to U.S. citizens and 
aliens lawfully residing here and by right, simply because they look or sound foreign.”). 
  64. Id. at 15,740. 
  65. Id.; see also id. at 15,945 (statement of Rep. Evans) (“Employers who want 
to discriminate against minorities will have a legitimate reason for doing so. And to [e]nsure 
that they are complying with the law, overcautious employers may quit hiring suspected 
illegals.”).  
  66. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 33,220 (1986) (statement of Sen. Hart) (“The 
employer sanctions in the legislation will undoubtedly act as an incentive for businesses to 
‘play it safe’ and refuse to hire individuals whose status may be in question.”); see also, 
e.g., id. at 29,994 (statement of Rep. Roybal) (referring to the likelihood that employers will 
discriminate because they will want to avoid sanctions under the new law); id. at 29,992 
(statement of Rep. Garcia) (same); 130 CONG. REC. 16,208 (1984) (statement of Rep. 
Schroeder) (same); id. at 15,715 (statement of Rep. Hance) (same); 118 CONG. REC. 30,183 
(1972) (statement of Rep. Roybal) (same). 
  67. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 97-485, at 119 (1982) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) 
(expressing concern for “Hispanic Americans”); 132 CONG. REC. 31,631–32 (1986) 
(statement of Rep. Rodino) (referring to concern about the Hispanic community); 130 
CONG. REC. 15,882 (1984) (statement of Rep. Richardson) (expressing concern for 
“Americans of Hispanic origin that are not fair haired”); id. at 15,715 (statement of Rep. 
Hance) (expressing concern for individuals “with a Spanish surname”); 119 CONG. REC. 
14,187 (1973) (statement of Rep. Ketchum) (expressing concern for “Mexican-American 
constituents” and describing proposed legislation as “aimed right down the throat of every 
American of Mexican descent in the United States”); 118 CONG. REC. 30,182 (1972) 
(statement of Rep. Badillo) (expressing concern for “anyone who speaks with an accent 
and/or has the appearance of being Latin or Hispanic”). 
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workers. In 1972, for instance, a congressperson stated that “illegal alien” was a 
“code word” for Latinos in the United States.69 Moreover, in 1986, Representative 
Roybal stated that many members were “fearful” that some employers would want 
to avoid employer sanctions and would “just not interview anyone who may 
appear to be Hispanic and quite obviously Asian.”70 This is consistent with an 
abundance of other lawmakers’ statements that Latinos and Asians would be 
particularly disadvantaged when searching for jobs.71 
Thus, due to these employee civil rights concerns, many lawmakers called 
for solutions to offset the employment discrimination that could result from 
IRCA.72 Indeed, during Congress’s long deliberations, there were various 
proposals for how to reduce the likelihood that workplace-based immigration 
enforcement would result in employment discrimination.73 Early forms of the 
proposed legislation, for example, had included employer sanctions for hiring 
unauthorized workers but had not required employers to check the work 
authorization of all prospective employees. Instead, under this proposal, the 
employer could request a statement from some employees about their immigration 
                                                                                                            
  68. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 33,242 (1986) (statement of Sen. Biden) 
(expressing concern for the Hispanic and Asian communities); 119 CONG. REC. 14,201 
(1973) (statement of Rep. Roybal) (describing the bill as “the most discriminatory bill 
against Mexican Americans and Asians which has been brought to the floor of this House”); 
118 CONG. REC. 30,183 (1972) (same) (expressing concern for “Americans from Mexican 
and Asian heritage”). 
  69. 118 CONG. REC. 30,182 (1972) (statement of Rep. Badillo); see also 119 
CONG. REC. 14,187 (1973) (statement of Rep. Ketchum) (“When we think in terms of illegal 
aliens, we think only of one ethnic group—those of Mexican origin.”). See generally Kevin 
R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of 
Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 264–71 (1997) (discussing the use of the 
term “alien” and its effect on the treatment of noncitizens). 
  70. 132 CONG. REC. 29,994 (1986) (statement of Rep. Roybal). 
  71. See, e.g., id.; 129 CONG. REC. 12,816 (1983) (statement of Sen. Cranston); 
119 CONG. REC. 14,187 (1973) (statement of Rep. Ketchum); 118 CONG. REC. 30,183 
(1972) (statement of Rep. Roybal).  
  72. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 2, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5761 (“The Committee on Education and Labor strongly endorses this 
provision and . . . has consistently expressed its fear that the imposition of employer 
sanctions will give rise to employment discrimination against Hispanic Americans and other 
minority group members.”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-506, at 15 (1975) (describing a “provision 
which specifically authorizes the Attorney General to bring civil actions” to remedy 
discrimination); 130 CONG. REC. 15,953 (1984) (statement of Rep. McCain) (stating that 
“we must have a verification system” that avoids discrimination); 118 CONG. REC. 30,155 
(1972) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (describing aspects of the proposal that would “[e]nsure 
that employment discrimination against members of ethnic and minority groups does not 
occur”). 
  73. For instance, many argued that Congress should keep the burdens on 
employers minimal in order to reduce incentives for employers to discriminate out of fear of 
violating employer sanctions laws. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 68 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5672; STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. NO. 1 OF THE H. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., ILLEGAL ALIENS, A REVIEW OF HEARINGS 
CONDUCTED DURING THE 92D CONGRESS (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter A REVIEW OF 
HEARINGS CONDUCTED DURING THE 92D CONGRESS]. 
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status in order to defend against accusations that they were in violation of the 
employer sanctions law.74 
A number of members of Congress successfully advocated for changing 
the proposed legislation so that employers were required to treat all employees 
equally. The concern was that employers would require a statement “of certain 
people and not of others, largely based upon appearance, or language . . . and that 
this in effect would mean that Mexican-Americans . . . would be required to file 
statements while other persons would not.”75 By the early 1980s, legislative 
proposals commonly included a requirement that employers verify the work 
authorization of all of their prospective employees.76 
Throughout Congress’s consideration of IRCA, there was broad 
agreement among lawmakers that part of the solution was for the legislation, and 
those enforcing it, to work in coordination with the EEOC and Title VII to protect 
employees’ civil rights. For instance, lawmakers called for an antidiscrimination 
taskforce, which included interagency coordination between the EEOC and the 
U.S. Attorney General.77 As illuminated above, a joint antidiscrimination taskforce 
was eventually incorporated into the legislation to evaluate whether it had 
discriminatory effects.   
                                                                                                            
  74. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 982, supra note 55, at 27–28 (testimony of 
Laurence H. Silberman, Acting U.S. Att’y Gen.) (critiquing proposal because “an American 
citizen with a foreign surname or foreign accent might be required to execute an affidavit 
regarding his citizenship in order to get a job, while other Americans might not be asked for 
a similar statement”).  
  75. Id. at 201 (statement of Kenneth A. Meiklejohn, Legislative Counsel, Dep’t 
of Legislation, Am. Fed’n of Labor and Cong. of Indus. Orgs.); see also id. at 208 
(statement of Rep. Russo, Member, Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on 
Immigration, Citizenship, and Int’l Law) (“It would seem to me that if somebody walked in 
who had a name like Miller or Smith and had no accent you would not ask him for anything. 
Yet if he walked in with a name like Russo or something else and had a foreign accent, they 
would request identification.”); Hearings Before the Subcomm. No. 1, supra note 60, at 84 
(statement of Rep. Roybal) (expressing concern that the bill “provides the employer with 
immunity if he obtains from the prospective employee a signed statement in writing that 
such a person is not an illegal”). 
  76. See, e.g., Joint Hearings on H.R. 5872 and S. 2222, supra note 62, at 274 
(statement of Rep. Mazzoli) (stating that all employers should be required “to show their 
eligibility,” and these measures “might eliminate some of the discrimination, some of the 
selectivity of the enforcement, some of the Government intervention at the workplace”); 
SCIRP SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 577 (describing proposal that 
employers verify the status of “all persons”).  
  77. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-890, pt. 1, at 44 (1982) (referring to proposed 
taskforce, including the Attorney General, the DOL, and the EEOC to examine charges of 
discrimination); H.R. REP. NO. 94-506, at 15–16 (1975) (referring to proposal authorizing 
the U.S. Attorney General to bring discrimination claims while the EEOC worked through 
its backlog); 130 CONG. REC. 15,710 (1984) (statement of Rep. Fish) (same); id. at 15,740 
(statement of Rep. Hawkins) (describing inadequate proposal for coordination between 
immigration officials, EEOC, and other labor departments to “monitor if discrimination is 
actually happening”). 
1150 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 53:1137 
Despite broad agreement about the necessity of interagency coordination 
involving the EEOC and the importance of Title VII,78 however, there was lengthy 
congressional debate about whether Title VII and the EEOC alone were sufficient 
to remedy the discrimination that would ensue or whether Congress needed to 
make legislative changes to heighten civil rights protections. As Part I described, 
the latter view ultimately prevailed and Congress relied on the EEOC and Title VII 
in conjunction with the Special Counsel and IRCA’s new civil rights protections.   
Nonetheless, the debate about whether Congress needed to create 
additional civil rights protections as part of the legislation illustrates the centrality 
of civil rights to the workplace-based immigration enforcement scheme that 
Congress eventually enacted. It also illuminates the close relationship between 
IRCA and Title VII/EEOC. On the one hand, some lawmakers expressed the 
sentiment that Title VII and the EEOC were sufficient to offset any discrimination 
that would result from workplace-based immigration enforcement.79 In 1973, for 
instance, Representative Mario Biaggi stated: “[I]t bears repeating that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 clearly prohibits any discrimination based on national origin. 
Employers may find themselves afoul of this law, should they choose to bar any 
foreign born person from their employ.”80 Similarly, in 1986, Senator Orrin Hatch 
stated that “the hard fact of the matter is that current civil rights law already 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin, as well as race, gender, and 
religion. This is more than adequate to deal with a pattern of discrimination in any 
business, industry, or agricultural setting.”81 
On the other hand, however, many members of Congress expressed the 
concern that Title VII and the EEOC were necessary, but not sufficient, to 
counteract the employment discrimination that would likely flow from workplace-
                                                                                                            
  78. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-890, pt. 1, at 44 (1982) (“It is clear from this 
decision and regulations which have been promulgated by the Equal [Employment] 
Opportunity Commission subsequent to this decision that any outright refusal by an 
employer to hire, as well as the dismissal of, individuals because of their foreign appearance 
or ethnic background would contravene the provisions of Title VII.”); SCIRP SUPPLEMENT 
TO THE FINAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 573 (referring to Title VII as a possible approach to 
protecting against national origin discrimination); A REVIEW OF HEARINGS CONDUCTED 
DURING THE 92D CONGRESS, supra note 73, at 25 (noting that Title VII would help protect 
employees from national origin discrimination). 
  79. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-108, at 13 (1974) (“[R]ecognizing the constraints 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Committee feels that the fear that 
employment discrimination will result is not well founded.”); 130 CONG. REC. 15,721 
(1984) (statement of Rep. Berman) (suggesting that the EEOC and Title VII are sufficient to 
address employment discrimination); id. at 15,716 (statement of Rep. Smith) (“[T]he bill 
does not in any way diminish existing antidiscrimination laws . . . .”); 119 CONG. REC. 
14,196 (1973) (statement of Rep. Eilberg) (referring to the EEOC, among other agencies, as 
“effective” and “working”); id. at 14,186 (statement of Rep. Rodino) (“Moreover, it should 
be emphasized that [T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the guidelines issued by 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission prohibit employment discrimination based 
on national origin. Therefore, any refusal by an employer to interview or hire permanent 
resident aliens or citizens of certain ethnic backgrounds . . . [is] prohibited.”). 
  80. 119 CONG. REC. 14,190 (1973) (statement of Rep. Biaggi). 
  81. 132 CONG. REC. 33,243 (1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
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based immigration enforcement.82 Some called for increased funding for EEOC 
enforcement of Title VII if Congress passed employer sanctions.83 Others 
identified Title VII’s jurisdictional limit, which applies only to workplaces with 15 
or more employees, as particularly problematic. Because of this limit in Title VII’s 
coverage, some lawmakers felt that small employers would be allowed to 
discriminate based on national origin.84 Moreover, others identified Title VII’s 
failure to consistently protect employees from citizenship status discrimination as 
worrisome.85 Thus, for these lawmakers, there was insufficient assurance that Title 
VII’s protections against national origin discrimination would protect individuals 
who were not citizens, but who were authorized to work in the United States, from 
discrimination.86 
                                                                                                            
  82. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 29,994 (1986) (statement of Rep. Roybal) (“There 
are Members of this House who believe that we already have some protection against 
discrimination or that we are going to establish a group that will look into it. The truth of the 
matter is that we don’t.”); 130 CONG. REC. 16,209 (1984) (statement of Rep. Schroeder) 
(“And don’t be fooled that [T]itle VII will fully protect these Americans. Not all 
discriminatory practices are made unlawful by [T]itle VII.”); id. at 15,910 (statement of 
Rep. Hawkins) (advocating a proposal that employees have a cause of action for 
employment discrimination “which augments but does not duplicate the jurisdiction of 
[T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964”). 
  83. See, e.g., Joint Hearings on H.R. 5872 and S. 2222, supra note 62, at 180 
(statement of John H.F. Shattuck, Director, Am. Civil Liberties Union) (“I think it is 
absolutely essential that this Congress make it clear that the employment discrimination 
laws . . . not only be enforced, but that the appropriations for them be greatly increased.”); 
S. REP. NO. 97-485, at 120 (1982) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“Part of the incentive to 
hire undocumented aliens is their willingness to accept substandard wages and working 
conditions. We must therefore intensify the enforcement of existing laws, 
including . . . Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.”); 119 CONG. REC. 14,201 (1973) (statement 
of Rep. Roybal) (expressing the sentiment that the EEOC was already overburdened as it 
was). 
  84. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 2, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5761 (“[Title VII leaves] unprotected those employees employed by 
employers of less than 15 employees. Those falling within this class would be denied 
protection from any act of discrimination based on alienage or national origin.”); H.R. REP. 
NO. 97-890, pt. 1, at 222 (1982) (“[E]xisting federal anti-discrimination agencies either lack 
jurisdiction, in many cases, or are incapable of handling the increased workload that would 
result from this legislation.”). 
  85. See, e.g., SCIRP SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 573 
(describing views that Title VII could not adequately protect against citizenship status 
discrimination). 
  86. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. No. 1, supra note 60, at 84 
(statement of Rep. Roybal) (“The burden [to prove discrimination] is impossible because 
the Civil Rights Act only prohibits discrimination based on national origin but not on 
citizenship.”); H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 2, at 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5757, 5762 (“Since Title VII does not provide any protection against employment 
discrimination based on alienage or non-citizen status, the Committee is of the view that the 
instant legislation must do so.” (citation omitted)).  
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IRCA’s legislative history further brings to light Congress’s promotion of 
a public education campaign to protect against discrimination.87 Moreover, the 
legislative history, similar to the enacted legislation as described in Part I, suggests 
that lawmakers wanted immigration agents, along with other federal agencies, to 
engage in education about civil rights protections. For instance, in 1973, 
Representative Jonathan Bingham stated:  
Government agencies have a duty to remind employers that [T]itle 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of national origin, and the agencies must 
[e]nsure that the implementation of [workplace-based immigration 
enforcement] does not cause job discrimination against legitimate 
employees of the affected ethnic and minority groups.88  
Similarly, in 1975, lawmakers expected “the Attorney General to fully inform 
employers as to the various provisions contained in [the proposed legislation] and 
to explain to them their respective responsibilities under this legislation and Title 
VII.”89 
As this review of IRCA’s legislative history demonstrates, civil rights 
protections against employment discrimination are not “secondary” to IRCA’s 
workplace-based immigration enforcement scheme. In fact, one lawmaker even 
went so far as to describe IRCA’s antidiscrimination provision as “one of the most 
far-reaching and important civil rights provisions in recent history.”90 Employee 
civil rights became part of the heart of the legislation, at least in part, because 
employment discrimination was “the principal objection raised to employer 
sanctions” during Congress’s deliberations.91 In 1986, Senator Joseph Biden 
referred to the prohibitions against citizenship and national origin discrimination, 
                                                                                                            
  87. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-890, pt. 1, at 43 (1982) (referencing “an 
extensive public education program” as part of the legislation’s efforts to “minimize” the 
“possibility of national origins employment discrimination”). 
  88. 119 CONG. REC. 14,192 (1973) (statement of Rep. Bingham); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 93-108, at 13 (1974) (stating that “the Committee anticipates that INS officials 
will fully advise employers as to their respective responsibilities under Title VII and this 
bill”). 
  89. H.R. REP. NO. 94-506, at 16 (1975); see also S. 2252: Alien Adjustment and 
Employment Act of 1977, Part 2: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th 
Cong. 7 (1978) (statement of Harry Surface, Agent, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Serv.) (“My own personal belief is that, through a cooperative effort between employers and 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, [workplace-based immigration enforcement] 
can be done without discriminating against persons of Latin or Hispanic History.”); H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-506, at 16 (1975) (“It is the expectation of this Committee that [workplace-
based immigration enforcement] be implemented in a manner which prevents job 
discrimination against ethnic and minority groups, and the Committee intends to closely 
scrutinize the administration of this section . . . by the Attorney General.”). 
  90. 132 CONG. REC. 31,632 (1986) (statement of Rep. Rodino); see also id. 
(“Antidiscrimination legislation of this nature is unprecedented in that it is based upon 
anticipated discrimination, rather than [a] historical pattern of past discrimination.”). 
  91. 130 CONG. REC. 15,710 (1984) (statement of Rep. Fish); see also 132 CONG. 
REC. 29,984 (1986) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (referring to discrimination concerns and to 
discrimination protections as “an essential element of employer sanctions”). 
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as well as the Special Counsel, as “absolutely essential to the success of this 
experiment.”92 Nonetheless, while IRCA’s civil rights protections may have been 
viewed as far-reaching by some, to others they were merely sufficient enough to 
support the overall legislation, which included an extensive legalization program.93 
Still others felt that the bill, even with the enhanced protections against 
discrimination that were added over the course of lengthy legislative consideration, 
would likely result in invidious employment discrimination.94 
III. THE EEOC AS CIVIL RIGHTS MONITOR 
It is imperative to give the EEOC an ex ante civil rights monitoring and 
educational role. As Parts I and II illuminated, it would accord with Congress’s 
intent to incorporate civil rights protections into the heart of IRCA’s workplace-
based immigration enforcement scheme. Congress intended IRCA to both reduce 
illegal immigration and to preserve employees’ civil rights.95 Furthermore, the 
EEOC’s new role would be consistent with Congress’s intent to include the EEOC 
and Title VII in various forms of interagency coordination and public education to 
protect against employment discrimination.   
The inadequacies of current interagency coordination between ICE and 
the DOL and the monitoring solution that Professor Lee constructs are similarly 
applicable to the EEOC context. Even though the EEOC and ICE are, as Professor 
Lee portrays, “empowered to jointly regulate the workplace on relatively equal 
terms,”96 there has been an “asymmetrical” relationship between these agencies. 
Much of this asymmetry is attributable to the informational challenges that 
Professor Lee describes.97 Given the apparent tangle of immigration enforcement 
                                                                                                            
  92. 132 CONG. REC. 33,245 (1986) (statement of Sen. Biden); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 99-682, pt. 2, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5761 (“It is the 
[Committee on Education and Labor’s] view that if there is to be sanctions enforcement and 
liability there must be an equally strong and readily available remedy if resulting 
employment discrimination occurs.”); 132 CONG. REC. 30,905 (1986) (joint explanatory 
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in the workplace, many employees do not have proper incentive to come forward 
to complain about civil rights abuses in the workplace. This is even more 
problematic in the EEOC context because the EEOC’s enforcement scheme is 
completely reliant on the receipt of complaints from employees. Unlike the DOL, 
the EEOC cannot act in the absence of an employee complaint, even if the EEOC 
has reason to believe that there are major civil rights abuses occurring.98 
The asymmetrical relationship between the EEOC and ICE cannot be 
solved through executive oversight or by giving the EEOC immigration 
enforcement authority, for the same reasons that Professor Lee cites in the DOL 
context.99 Instead, ex ante interagency monitoring that includes the EEOC, coupled 
with existing ex post solutions, is a superior way to offset the existing asymmetry 
between ICE and the EEOC. The EEOC, along with the DOL, could monitor and 
restrict ICE’s reliance on “tips” that come from retaliatory employers or 
disgruntled co-workers when deciding about which workplaces to target. 
Moreover, these labor agencies could work with civil society groups, which have 
close relationships with workers, to help them calculate the labor consequences of 
immigration enforcement activities at particular workplaces.100 These kinds of ex 
ante approaches could reduce the “likelihood that immigration law will be co-
opted” to endanger workers’ rights.101 
This Response Essay’s close review of IRCA’s text and legislative history 
brings an additional proposal to the forefront—an interagency public education 
campaign involving the EEOC. Along with its monitoring role, the EEOC should 
play a role in disseminating information to employees about their civil rights in the 
context of workplace-based immigration enforcement. Moreover, the EEOC and 
other labor agencies should coordinate educational efforts with ICE so that ICE no 
longer engages in “misinformation” campaigns that confuse employees about the 
relationship between immigration enforcement and the enforcement of employee 
rights.102 Ideally, a robust interagency educational campaign would help facilitate 
claims-making by consistently assuring employees that their assertion of rights in 
the workplace would not lead to their deportation or other immigration 
consequences. As part of the solution, it is essential to directly address this 
informational gap. Employees themselves will continue to be key private enforcers 
of workplace rights, given limited agency resources and the “logic” of complaint-
driven workplace regulation.103  
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The EEOC’s ex ante civil rights monitoring and educational role could 
help address the early trepidations expressed by some lawmakers that workplace-
based immigration enforcement can push immigrant workers further into the 
shadows. As one representative stated during the first year that Congress 
considered workplace-based immigration enforcement, employers sometimes 
“threaten to expose the [unauthorized immigrant] to immigration officials” if the 
immigrant complains about working conditions.104 And, as Senator Kennedy stated 
in 1982, the threat of workplace raids by immigration authorities can “spread 
unnecessary fear and alarm in the Hispanic community.”105 The EEOC, and other 
labor agencies, could help to ameliorate these dynamics.   
Some may wonder why my civil rights monitoring proposal focuses 
primarily on the EEOC, rather than the Special Counsel. Undoubtedly, the Special 
Counsel should continue its ongoing efforts and is well-positioned to play a 
supportive role in the proposed civil rights monitoring and educational framework. 
The EEOC, however, is better situated to spearhead the proposed efforts for a 
number of reasons. Title VII and the EEOC, for instance, provide a broader scope 
of civil rights protections than IRCA and the Special Counsel. Title VII protects 
employees from employment discrimination based on national origin, race, color, 
ethnicity, sex, or religion. IRCA covers only national origin and citizenship status 
discrimination. While Title VII prohibits employers from discriminatory acts that 
affect employees’ conditions of employment,106 IRCA more narrowly prohibits 
employers’ discriminatory hiring, termination, and recruitment practices.107 
Perhaps most importantly, Title VII’s civil rights protections extend to 
unauthorized employees and IRCA’s protections do not.108 Thus, the EEOC is in a 
stronger position to take the lead in a new civil rights monitoring and education 
regime. The EEOC’s new duties would be consistent with its goal “to make sure 
that immigration law, immigration status, and immigration officers are not 
weapons in the arsenal of an unscrupulous employer, and that a worker can pursue 
her federal civil rights claims.”109   
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CONCLUSION 
Professor Lee’s article, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, rightfully 
encourages us to turn our attention to the agencies that are, as well as the agencies 
that should be, involved in workplace-based immigration enforcement. He 
illuminates that ICE currently views labor goals as secondary to its “primary 
mission of detaining and removing noncitizens,” and too often fails to properly 
consider the workplace rights of employees.110 To respond to this problem, he 
emphasizes the need to involve the DOL and other labor agencies in ex ante 
monitoring of ICE’s workplace enforcement actions.    
My aim in this Response Essay has been twofold. First, I argue that ICE 
must change its view of its mission to accord with congressional intent. As Parts I 
and II explained, the preservation of employee civil rights in the face of 
workplace-based immigration enforcement is not secondary to IRCA’s workplace-
based immigration enforcement scheme. Instead, employee civil rights are—and 
therefore should be consistently viewed as—fundamental aspects of IRCA.   
Second, I contend that the EEOC should become an ex ante civil rights 
monitor and educator in the workplace-based immigration enforcement context. 
Through statutory interpretation and an extensive review of legislative history, this 
Response Essay demonstrated that Congress intended Title VII and the EEOC to 
be folded into IRCA’s civil rights agenda. Given the sometimes contradictory 
impulses between the vigorous enforcement of exclusionary aspects of 
immigration law and civil rights enforcement, the EEOC should help to ensure that 
ICE adequately considers the employee civil rights consequences of its workplace-
based immigration enforcement actions. Moreover, given existing informational 
gaps and other inhibitors of civil rights enforcement, the EEOC should engage in 
extensive employee education to offset immigrant employees’ fear of coming 
forward when they experience sexual harassment, assault, or other forms of 
discrimination in the workplace. 
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